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THE DEMISE OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS IN OSHA STANDARDS: 
AMERICAN TEXTILE 
MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE v. 
DONOVAN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, l 
the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (the Agency or 
OSHA), in promulgating standards regulating worker exposure 
to toxic or harmful substances pursuant to section 655(b) of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act),1 is re-
solved to first conduct a cost-benefit analysis. The Court re-
served the issue by determining that "cost benefit analysis by 
OSHA is not required by the statute because a feasibility analy-
sis is."1 
During the prior term, the Court had deftly avoided the 
question of cost-benefit analysis while deciding Industrial 
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Insti-
tute. 4 In American Petroleum, a plurality of the Court upheld a 
Fifth Circuit decision which struck down the benzene regulation 
because the Agency had not shown that the standard was "rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful 
employment."11 Having disposed of the case on the ground that 
the Secretary failed to make a finding of a significant health 
risk, the Court did not have to address the further question of 
whether the Fifth Circuit was correct in requiring a reasonable 
correlation between costs and health and benefits. The plurality 
opinion in American Petroleum seemed to hint, however, that in 
1. 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981). 
2. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976». 
3. 101 S. Ct. at 2490. 
4. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
5. ld. at 613 (quoting American Petroleum lnat. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 
1978». 
449 
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the future the Court would require cost-benefit analysis in the 
regulation of toxic substances under Section 655(b).8 
The purpose of a cost-benefit analysis' is to aid deci-
sionmakers in allocating scarce societal resources in the most 
beneficial manner. Theoretically, the cost-benefit analysis is sim-
ple: Each expected cost and benefit associated with a given ac-
tivity is identified and valued in an equivalent unit, usually dol-
lars, to aid in quantification.8 All expected costs and benefits are 
then added separately, and whichever side attains the highest 
value prevails. Presumably, cost-benefit analysis provides a sci-
entific basis upon which to make decisions.' 
The use of the cost-benefit analysis in the areas of health 
and safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection, 
where human life is at stake however, is fraught with fundamen-
tal problems and limitations. Answering the basic questions of 
how costs and benefits should be identified,lo what values should 
6. See 448 U.S. at 639·40 (Stevena, J.) (reading §§ 655(b)(5) and 652(8) together to 
force the Agency to find a significant risk of harm to worker health at present levels of 
exposure, before new regulations are promulgated). Once a significant risk of harm is 
quantified, a value can be assigned and it is but a short step to fun cost·benefit analysis. 
See notes 7·13 infra and accompanying text. E.g., Justice Powen in his concurrence in 
American Petroleum would read cost·benefit analysis into the Act. See 448 U.S. at 664, 
667·71. 
7. As used in this Note the term cost·benefit analysis meane "the weighing of the 
costs of complying with the regulation againat the health and safety benefits that will 
result." Note, Section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: I. 
Cost·Benefit Analysis Required?, 49 FORDHAM L. RBv. 432, 435·36 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Is Cost·Benefit Analysis Required). For more indepth discU88ions of the benefits 
and detriments of cost·benefit analysis ,ee generally Baram, COlt· Benefit Analysis: An 
Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 
EcOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980); Green, Cost·Risk·Benefit Assessment and the Law: Introduc-
tion and Perspective, 45 Gso. WASH. L. RBv. 901 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Green, 
Cost·Risk·Benefit Assessment); Green, The Risk·Benefit CalculUl in Safety Determina· 
tions, 43 Gso. WASH. L. RBv. 791 (1975) [hereinafter cited 88 Green, Risk·Benefit 
Calculus); Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for Govern· 
ment Regulation, 43 Gso. WASH. L. REv. 808 (1975); Kasper, C08t·Benefit Analysis in 
Environmental Decision·Making, 45 GBO. WASH. L. RBV. 1013 (1977); Rowe, Govern· 
mental Regulation of Societal Riska, 45 Gso. WASH. L. REv. 944 (1977); Note, COlt· 
Benefit Analysis for Standards Regulating Toxic Substance, Under the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act: American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 60 B.U.L. RBV. 115 
(1980) [hereinafter cited 88 Note, Standards Regulating Toxic Subltancel.). 
8. Note, Standards Regulating Toxic Subltances, supra note 7, at 140. See also 
Baram, supra note 7, at 477·78. 
9. Note, Standards Regulating Toxic Sub,tances, supra note 7, at 140. See gener-
ally materials cited note 7 supra. 
10. See Baram, supra note 7, at 482·83 ("Cost· benefit analysis offers no protection 
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be placed on them now and in the future, II and how values are 
to be assigned to intangible costs and benefits which are not 
readily identifiable,ll1 is a highly subjective task and vulnerable 
to both honest mistakes and dishonest manipulation by the indi-
vidual or group doing the analysis.18 Seen in the practical per-
spective of trying to construct a cost-benefit analysis which rea-
sonably will anticipate all prospective costs and benefits, the 
analysis can be a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma. "14 
The thesis of this Note is that the decision in American 
Textile, read with the American Petroleum case, leaves no sig-
nificant barriers impeding the Agency from achieving its pri-
mary goal of providing workers with the safest work environ-
ment possible. This Note will analyze the decision in American 
Textile, and the future of cost-benefit analysis in its wake. Part 
One outlines briefly the statutory framework of the Act and its 
against historically bad assumptions .... ") (quoting E. STOKEY & R. ZECHHAUSER, A 
PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 148·49 (1978». For example, if cost·benefit analysis had 
been mandated in American Textile, would the Agency be correct in including secondary 
costs which could be avoided by the regulation of a toxic substance, such as welfare and 
medical costs attributable to the illness contracted by the worker? These secondary costs 
would include aid to families with dependent children, workers' compensation, medical 
expenses, and costs of other social services. See Note, Standards Regulating Tozic Sub· 
stances, supra note 7, at 141 n.14S. 
11. To conduct a proper cost·benefit analysis, the future costs and the benefits of an 
activity must be determined. This requires that future costs and benefits be "dis· 
counted" to determine their present value. Baram, supra note 7, at 486·87. Problems in 
discounting future values arise, not in the process to be used in discounting these costs, 
but in the correct discount rate to be applied. Note, Standards Regulating Tozic Sub· 
stances, supra note 7, at 141 n.143. 
12. How can an Agency seriously put an accurate dollar amount on the price of a 
life? Agencies have developed at least three ways of valuing lives: (1) placing a dollar 
amount on the future earnings of a worker whose career is ended prematurely by death 
or injury; (2) measuring the cost of the ways used to prevent a death when a person is ill 
or in danger (e.g., how much will society spend to rescue coal miners trapped in a mine 
after an accident); and (3) the salary differential between an activity with a normal dan· 
ger level and one which is very hazardous (e.g., working on an oil drilling platform as 
opposed to extinguishing an out·of·control fire on the same platform). These measures 
still have their flaws. Note, Is Cost·Benefit Analysis Required?, supra note 7, at 437·40. 
The public is unwilling to accept the concept that human life has a dollar value. 
Wheeler, The Public's Costly Mistrust of Cost·Benefit Safety Analysis, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 
13, 1980, at 26, col. 2. Commentators also recommend cautious use of cost· benefit analy· 
sis when quantifying intangibles. See Baram, supra note 7, at 484. 
13. Baram, supra note 7, at 487·90; Note, Standards Regulating Tozic Substances, 
supra note 7, at 141. 
14. J. BARTLETI', FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 743 (1Sth ed. Boston) (1st ed. Boston) (Win· 
ston Churchill radio broadcast to England, October I, 1939). 
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pertinent sections. Part Two describes the judicial interpreta-
tions of the Act. Finally, Part Three discusses the American 
Textile decision and its implications. 
II. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 
OF 1970 
A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Congress expressly passed the Act "to assure so far as possi-
ble every working man and woman in the Nation safe and 
. healthful working conditions and to preserve our human re-
sources . . . ."111 The Act in its inception covered an estimated 
4.1 million places of business with 57 million employees. Ie 
Section 652(8) defines the term "occupational safety and 
health standard" as one "which requires conditions, or the adop-
IS. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1970). When the Act was passed in 1970, 14,500 persons were 
killed annually in work· related accidents. An additional 2.2 million workers were dis· 
abled annually, resulting in a 1088 of 2SO million worker days. The accompanying 1088 to 
economic productivity is equally staggering. It was estimated that over $1.5 billion in 
wages were lost due to these injuries. The annual loss to the Gr088 National Product was 
estimated at over $8 billion. SENATE SuaCOMM. ON LABOR OP SENATE COMM. ON LABOR 
AND Puauc WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP THB OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
Ac:r OP 1970, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. 144, reprinted in (1971] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NBws 
5177 (hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
Toxic substances were singled out for special attention by Congress. The United 
States Surgeon General, after conducting a study in metropolitan areas, found that 65% 
of the workers in the study were potentially exposed to harmful physical agents (includ· 
ing noise) or toxic material. In contrast, the study showed that a mere 25 percent of the 
workers studied were adequately protected by standards limiting exposure to these 
dangers. 
To illustrate the magnitude of the problem and the extent to which it largely had 
been ignored by the businesa and industrial communities, Congresa pointed to the cotton 
industry and the effects of cotton dust on workers: 
Id. 
(D]espite repeated warnings over the years from other coun· 
tries that their cotton workers suffered from lung disease, it is 
only witt.:n the past decade that we have recognized byssinosis 
among workers in American cotton mills. Recent studies now 
show that this illness, caused by the dust generated in the 
processing of cotton, and resulting in continuous IIhortnesa of 
breath, chronic cough, and total disablement, affects Bubstan· 
tial percentages of cotton textile workers. In Bome states as 
many as 30% of those in the carding or spinning rooms have 
been affected, and it has been estimated that 811 many as 
100,000 active or retired workers currently suffer from thiB 
disease. 
16. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, at 144. 
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tion or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations 
or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe 
or healthy employment and places of employment."17 
An important facet of the Act is the ability of the Secretary 
of Labor (the Secretary), working through the Agency, to pro-
mulgate standards regulating worker exposure to toxic 
substances. IS 
The Act empowers the Agency to adopt occupational safety 
and health standards by: (1) adopting any national consensus 
standard or established Federal standard in force at the time the 
Act was passedjll' (2) modifying, promulgating, or revoking any 
occupational safety or health standard through informal "notice 
and comment" rule-making proceduresjlo and (3), in the case of 
extraordinary hazards to workers, by promulgating "emergency 
temporary standards" to take effect immediately upon publica-
tion in the Federal Register.l1 
17. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976). 
18. Id. § 652(8). 
19. Id. § 655(A). This authority lasted for two years after the effective date of the 
Act and provided immediate protection until permanent standards could be promul-
gated. The Act defines a "national consensus standard" as: 
Id. § 652(9). 
[AJny occupational safety and health standard or modification 
thereof which (1) has been adopted and promulgated by a na-
tionally recognized standards-producing organization under 
procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary 
that persons interested and atl'ected by the scope or provisions 
of the standard have reached substantial agreement in its 
adoption, (2) was formulated in a manner which atl'orded an 
opportunity for diverse views to be considered, and (3) has 
been designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after 
consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies. 
The term "established Federal standards" is defined as "any operative occupational 
safety and health standard established by any agency of the United States and presently 
in effect, or contained in any Act of Congress in force on December 29, 1970." Id. § 
652(10). The Secretary can refuse to issue both national consensus standards and estab-
lished federal standards under the Act, if it is determined that "the promulgation of 
such raJ standard would not result in improved safety or health for specifically desig-
nated employees." Id. I 655(a). 
20. Id. § 655(b). Although the Act specifically exempts the Agency from compliance 
with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. I§ 551-559 (1970), the notice and com-
ment rule-making procedure, when combined with the substantial evidence rule for judi-
cial review of Agency standards, makes the procedures similar to the Hybrid procedures 
of the Magnuson-Moss Act, tit. 2, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C. (1976». 
21. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1976). This section reads: 
5
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When promulgating standards regulating toxic substances 
under the Act, section 655(b)(5) mandates the Secretary to 
set the standard which most adequately assures, 
to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best 
available evidence, that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional ca-
pacity. . . . [I]n addition to the attainment of the 
highest degree of health and safety protection for 
the employee, other considerations shall be the 
latest scientific data in the field, [and] the feasi-
bility of the standards. . . ." 
This statutory language, which lacks an explicit legislative 
history, left the Courts to determine what feasibility means and 
the extent to which it can or should affect the Agency's decision 
on which and how toxic substances are to be regulated. 
III. THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 
655(b)(5) OF THE ACT 
A. THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
The lower courts outlined the basic contours of both the ju-
dicial review of standards regulating toxic substances and the 
meaning of feasibility under Section 655(b)(5) in two key cases: 
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgsonll and Soci-
The Secretary shall provide, without regard to the require-
ments of chapter 5 of Title 5, for an emergency temporary 
standard to take immediate effect upon publication in the 
Federal Register if he determines (a) that employees are ex-
posed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents 
determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new 
hazards, and (b) that such emergency standard is neceBB8J')' to 
protect employees from such danger. 
(2) Such standard shall be effective until superceded by a 
standard promulgated in accordance with the procedures pre-
scribed in paragraph (3) of this subsection. 
(3) Upon publication of such a standard in the Federal Regis-
ter, the Secretary shall commence a proceeding in accordance 
with subsection (b) of this section, and the standard as pub-
lished shall also serve as a proposed rule for the proceeding. 
The Secretary shall promulgate a standard under this para-
graph no later than sa months after publication of the emer-
gency standard as provided in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection. 
22. Id. § 655(b)(5) (emphasis added). 
23. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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ety of Plastics Industry v. OSHA."f 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, the 
AFL~CIO challenged the Agency's issuance of permanent stan-
dards regulating worker exposure to asbestosll on the grounds 
that the Act does not permit the Agency to employ an economic 
analysis when promulgating standards for exposure to toxic sub-
stances."e The court rejected the union's contention.'" A unani-
mous court interpreted the "to the extent feasible" language of 
section 655(b)(5) to mean that "a standard that is prohibitively 
expensive is not feasible."16 The court further found that the 
Act requires the Agency to consider the economic impact of pro-
posed standards, including the technological feasibilities of 
achieving the requirements of the proposed standard, and rea-
soned that "Congress does not appear to have intended to pro-
tect employees by putting their employees out of busi-
ness-either by requiring protective devices unavailable under 
existing technology or by making financial viability generally 
impossible. ""11 
The court limited the use of economic feasibility as a re~ 
striction on the promulgation of standards for toxic substances, 
however, stating in dictum that "[s]tandards may be economi~ 
cally feasible even though, from the standpoint of employers, 
24. 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). 
25. The union relied on 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976). Prior to the iBSuance of perma-
nent standards, the Agency had exercised its powers under § 655(c) to iBBue temporary 
emergency standards. 499 F.2d at 471. Section 655(c) appears at note 21 supro. 
"Asbestos is a generic term applicable to a number of fibrous, inorganic, silicate 
minerals that are incombustible in air." 499 F.2d at 471. An estimated three to five mil-
lion workers are exposed annually to asbestos in the building trades and shipyard indus-
tries. Id. The inhalation of asbestos dust causes asbestosis (severe lung scarring) and 
manufacturing and construction workers exposed to the dust suffer from disproportion-
ately higher rates of pulmonary cancer. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supro note 15, at 145. 
26. 499 F.2d at 476. 
27. [d. at 477. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. In support of this proposition, the court quoted Senator Javits, author of the 
amendment adding the feasibility language to the Act: 
[d. 
As a result of this amendment, the Secretary, in setting stan-
dards, is expreBSly required to consider the feasibility of pro-
posed standards. This was an improvement over the Daniels 
bill, which might be interpreted to require absolute health and 
safety in all cases, regardleBS of feasibility, and the Adminis-
tration bill, which contains no criteria for standards at all. 
7
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they are financially burdensome and affect profit margins. . . . 
[T]he concept of economic feasibility [does not] guarantee the 
continued existence of individual employers.uao The court indi-
cated that if the proposed standards, for some industries, im-
posed undue hardship on an industry as a whole, then the 
Agency should consider that factor in determining feasibility.al 
In reviewing the asbestos standard, the court showed con-
siderable deference to the decisions made by the Secretary and 
the Agency on how best to regulate worker exposure to the toxin 
based upon both the complex scientific nature of the Agency's 
regulatory task and the quasi-legislative powers conferred on the 
Agency and the Secretary. 
[Slome of the questions involved in the promulga-
tion of these standards are on the frontiers of sci-
entific knowledge, and consequently as to them 
insufficient data is presently available to make a 
fully informed determination. Decision-making 
must in that circumstance depend to a greater ex-
tent upon policy judgments and less upon purely 
factual analysis .... Judicial review of inherently 
legislative decisions of this sort is obviously an 
undertaking of different dimensions.1I 
While Industrial Union Department dealt primarily with 
economic feasibility under section 655(b)(5), the decision in So-
ciety of Plastics Industry v. OSHA scrutinized the meaning of 
technological feasibility." In Society of Plastics, manufacturers 
and users of vinyl chloride challenged the Agency's standards 
governing exp9sure, U contending that the standard was neither 
technologically nor economically feasible.81 
30. Id. at 478. 
31.Id. 
32. Id. at 474-75. The court noted that the review of Agency determinations in this 
case was basically a review of fundamental policy, rather than a traditional case in con-
troversy. Id. 
33. For a detailed explanation of these cases, see Berger & Ruskin, Economic and 
Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Sublltances under the Occupational and 
Safety Health Act, 7 EcOLOGY L.Q. 285 (1978). 
34. Vinyl chloride is the gaseous raw material used in the manufacture of plastics. 
The standard governing vinyl chloride appears at 29 C.F.R § 1910.1017 (1981). See gen-
erally Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and 
Policy of Toxic Substance Control, 7 EcOLOGY L.Q. 497, 522 (1978). 
35. 509 F.2d at 1308. As in the regulation of asbestos, the Agency in 1974 promul-
gated a temporary emergency standard regulating exposure levels of vinyl chloride. See 
8
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The Second Circuit upheld the Agency's vinyl chloride stan-
dard and said "the ultimate facts [the possible dangers to work-
ers] are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge .... [Under the 
Act] it remains the duty of the Secretary to act to protect the 
working man, and to act even in circumstances where existing 
methodology or research is deficient. "a8 The court further stated 
that the Secretary "may raise questions [or issue new standards] 
which require the development of new technology, and he is not 
limited to issuing standards based solely upon devices already 
fully developed."87 
B. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: Industrial Union De-
partment, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Institute, the Supreme Court for the first time dealt 
with the issue of feasibility under the Act. In American Petro-
leum, the court considered the Agency's standard for worker ex-
posure to benzene. as The primary danger from exposure to ben-
note 25 supra and accompanying text. The challenged standard reduced allowable expo-
sure to workers from the temporary emergency standard of 50 ppm. to a new permanent 
standard of 1 ppm. 
36. 509 F.2d at 1308 (quoting Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 
F.2d at 474.) Dismissing the industry's argument, the court upbraided the plaintiffs for 
their lack of belief in technology, stating, "it appears that (the industry] simply needs 
more faith in their own technological potentialities .... n 509 F.2d at 1309. 
37. 509 F.2d at 1309. The Second Circuit summarily disposed of the economic feasi-
bility issue by noting, "if the petitioners find that they cannot comply for reasons beyond 
their control, OSHA permits the amendment of standards." 1d. at 1310. For support, the 
court cited the temporary variance provision of the Act, § 655(b)(6)(A), which reads in 
pertinent part: 
Any employer may apply to the Secretary for a temporary or-
der granting variance from a standard or any provision thereof 
promulgated under this section. Such temporary order shall be 
granted only if the employer files an application which meets 
the requirements of clause (B) and establishes that (i) he is 
unable to comply with a standard by its effective date because 
of unavailability of profeBBional or technical personnel or of 
materials and equipment needed to come into compliance with 
the standard or because neceBBarY construction or alteration of 
facilities cannot be completed by the effective date, (ii) he is 
taking all available steps to safeguard his employees against 
the hazards covered by the standard, and (iii) he has an effec-
tive program for coming into compliance with the standard as 
quickly as practicable. 
38. Benzene is a toxic substance that is colorleBB, aromatic, and evaporates quickly 
under atmospheric exposure. Its principal uses are as an ingredient in the manufacture 
of fuels for internal combustion engines, solvents, detergents, and pesticides. 509 F.d at 
9
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zene is in the inhalation of fumes.88 Exposure to high 
concentrations of the chemical can have an immediate deadly 
effect on humans,4o and long-term exposure to lower concentra-
tions produces a slow death.41 
Prior to the Act, a national consensus standard governed ex-
posure to benzene,4I limiting exposure to "10 ppm averaged over 
an 8-hour period with a ceiling concentration of 25 ppm for 10-
minute periods or a maximum peak concentration of 30 ppm."" 
In 1971, the Agency adopted this national consensus standard 
pursuant to section 655(a) of the Act as an established federal 
standard.44 
In 1977, the Agency issued its permanent standard which 
lowered the permissible exposure level to 1 ppm.411 The Supreme 
Court, however, characte1'ized the Agency's administrative re-
cord supporting the 10 ppm level of exposure as "sketchy at 
best."4s Furthermore, the Agency made no findings on how a re-
duction of exposure from 10 ppm to 1 ppm would significantly 
reduce the risk, and, in fact, no studies had been conducted 
showing the correlation between exposure to 10 ppm or less of 
benzene.47 
Justice Stevens, writing the plurality opinion, rejected the 
arguments of all parties involved4s and held that sections 
1309. (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 5,91S (1978». Over one million workers are exposed annually 
to low-level concentrations of the substance. 448 U.S. at 615-16. 
39. 448 U.S. at 616. Once inhaled, the chemical is absorbed by the blood and dif-
fused throughout the body. 
40. rd. at 617. Exposure to concentrations of 20,000 ppm have an immediate effect 
on the central nervoua system. rd. Intermediate levels of exposure, from 500 to 250 ppm, 
cause mild symptoms of poisoning, nauaea, and vertigo. rd. (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 5,921 
(1978». 
41. 448 U.S. at 617. 
42. rd. The full text of this standard may be found at 43 Fed. Reg. 5,919 (1978). 
43. 448 U.S. at 617. 
44. rd. 
45. ld. at 624-26 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918 (1978». In the intervening period be-
tween the adoption of the national consensua standard in 1971 and the permanent stan-
dard in 1977, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1979), the Agency attempted to promulgate emer-
gency temporary standards, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,516 (1977), which were substantially the 
same 88 the eventual permanent standards. 448 U.S. at 623. The Fifth Circuit issued a 
temporary restraining order preventing the standard from taking effect. ld. 
46.448 U.S. at 631. 
47. ld. at 632-38. 
48. rd. at 639. The Agency argued that § 652(8) had "no legal significance or at best 
10
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655(b)(5) and 652(8) of the Act must be read together when 
pro~ulgating any permanent standard and required "the Secre-
tary ... to determine that it [the standard] is reasonably neces-
sary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material 
health impairment. "49 The Justice found support for his position 
in section 655(g)~O and 655(b)(8).~1 
Justice Stevens wrote that section 655(g) requires that: 
"[I)n determining the priority for establishing 
standards under this section, the Secretary shall 
give due regard to the urgency of the need for 
mandatory safety and health standards for partic-
ular industries, trades, crafts, occupations, busi-
nesses, workplaces or work environments" .... 
[I)f such an analysis must precede the promulga-
tion of any standard, it seems manifest that Con-
gress intended, at a bare minimum, that the 
Secretary find a significant risk of harm and 
therefore a probability of significant benefits 
before establishing a new standard:·1 
The second section, 655(b)(8), requires that when an ex-
isting consensus standard is substantially altered, "the Secretary 
[shall] publish ... a statement of reasons why the rule ... will 
better effectuate the purposes [of the Act.]"~8 The plurality 
stated that "[i]f this requirement was intended to be more than 
a meaningless formality, it must be read to impose upon the 
Secretary the duty to find that an existing national consensus 
merely requires that a standard not be totally vocational." [d. The industry argued that, 
reading §§ 655(b)(5) and 652(8) together would require the Agency to "quantify both the 
costs and the benefits of a proposed rule and to conclude that they are roughly commen· 
surate." [d. 
49. [d. at 639 (emphasis added). 
50. 29 U.S.C. § 655(g) (1976) reads as follows: 
In determining the priority for establishing standards under 
this section, the Secretary shall give due regard to the urgency 
of the need for mandatory safety and health standards for 
particular industries, trades, crafts, occupations, businesses, 
workplaces, or work environments. The Secretary shall also 
give due regard to the recommendations of the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare regarding the need for 
mandatory standards in determining the priority for establish· 
ing such standards. 
51. [d. § 655(b)(8). 448 U.S. at 643·44 (Stevens, J.). 
52. 448 U.S. at 643·44. 
53. [d. 
11
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standard is not adequate to protect workers from a cohtinuing 
and significant risk of harm."a. Justice Stevens stated that an 
alternative interpretation of the Act, giving the Secretary broad 
power to determine what risks are significant, might constitute a 
breach of the non-delegation doctrinell prohibiting the delega-
tion of legislative powers to agencies as outlined in Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States" and Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan. I' 
The Court also found support in the legislative history of 
the Act, which showed Congress "was concerned, not with abso-
lute safety, but with the elimination of significant harm."118 
However, the Court also stated that the threshold of signifi-
cant risk would not be a great barrier to regulating toxic sub-
stances, that the requirement is "not a mathematical strait jack-
et,"11 and that the Agency is not required to quantify risks "with 
anything approaching scientific certainty.'180 
Because the Court did not determine that a finding of sig-
nificant risk of harm was made before the benzene standard was 
promulgated, it was unnecessary to address the question of 
whether the cost of regulation was reasonable in relation to its 
benefits.1I1 
54.ld. 
55. ld. at 646. 
56. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
57. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
58. 448 U.S. at 646 (quoting LBGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, at 345) ("What 
are we going to do about a place in Florida whose mosquitos are getting at the employee 
. . . . Are we going to say that if employees get bitten by thoee for the rest of their lives 
they will not have been done any harm at all?") I&GI8LATIVE HISTORY. supra note 15, at 
245 (remarks of Sen. Dominick). 
59. 448 U.S. at 655. 
60. ld. at 656. As examples of the assessment involved in Identifying a significant 
risk, the Court stated that the chances of a person contracting cancer from a drink of 
chlorinated water would be insignificant, id., but, odds of one in one thousand that the 
prolonged inhalation of gasoline vapors containing benzene would cause cancer, might be 
a significanct risk. 1 d. at 655. 
To support a finding of significant risk it need only be IIUpported by "a body of 
reputable scientific thought." ld. at 656. This view of review ot Agency activities Is ex-
pressed in Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 474-75, and Society 
of Plastics v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1304. See discussion at notes lli·29 supra and accompa· 
nying text. 
61. 448 U.S. at 650. 
12
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Justice Powell, while concurring in the judgment, believed 
the Court should have decided the cost-benefit question." Jus-
tice Powell would require that the cost of regulation bear some 
reasonable relationship to its projected benefits," and argued 
that Congress did not intend these regulations to ignore eco-
nomic considerations and cause economic injury to the indus-
tries affected by these standards." 
The plurality opinion in American Petroleum has been both 
praised and criticized. In praising the opinion, attention focused 
on the use of cost-benefit analysis as a restraint on the intrusion 
of the government on private enterprise.e• In criticizing the 
opinion, commentators found the opinion encouraging judicial 
anarchy in the area of administrative law," undercutting the 
rule-making authority of OSHA,e7 misapprehending the legisla-
tive intent of the Act,e. and contributing to regulatory 
confusion.8e 
Speculation over the meaning of American Petroleum was 
quickly ended by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in 
American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan. 
IV. THE AMERICAN TEXTILE DECISION 
In American Textile Manufacturers v. Donovan, the cotton 
industry challenged a standard limiting worker exposure to cot-
62. Id. at 664. 
63. ld. at 667. "It is simply unreasonable to believe that Congress intended OSHA 
to pursue the desirable goal of risk-free workplace to the extent that the economic viabil-
ity of particular industries-or significant segments thereof-is threatened." Id. at 669. 
64. Id. at 671. Justice Rehnquist would strike down the Act as an unconstitutional 
delegation under Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 288 (1935). See note 55 supra. 
65. Note, OSHA after American Petroleum Institute: A Proposed Regulatory 
Budget, 33 STAN. L. REv. 917 (1981) (arguing that the Congress should impose a regula-
tory budget on OSHA regulations, serving as a ceiling on coats of compliance). 
66. Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in 
Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. LAw 301 (1980) (attacking the Benzene 
decision as allowing too much judicial review of Agency decision-making). 
67. Note, OSHA's Rulemaking Authority Under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act: Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute, 12 Loy. L. REv. 229 (1981). 
68. Note, Occupational Health and Safety-the Benzene Case: Life, Liberty and 
the Pursuit of Health-Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 311 (1980). 
69. Sullivan, The Benzene Decision: A Contribution to Regulatory Confusion, 33 
AD. L. REV. 351 (1981). 
13
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ton dust.'o 
On June 28, 1978, the Secretary issued final standards limit-
ing exposure to cotton dust over an eight hour period to 200 mgt 
mS for yarn manufacturing, 750 mg/m8 for slashing and weaving 
operations, and 500 mg/m8 for the other processes in the manu-
facture of cotton.71 In enacting the standard, the Agency be-
lieved itself obligated to adopt "the most stringent standard to 
protect against material health impairment, bounded only by 
technological and economic feasibility.'''· 
The cotton industry attacked the standards primarily on 
two grounds. The first relied on Justice Powell's in American 
Petroleum that the cost of the regulation did not bear a reasona-
ble relation to its benefit and that the Secretary failed to show 
the regulation "addresses a significant risk of material health 
impairment."" The other attacked the Secretary's determina-
tion that the standards were economically feasible as not sup-
ported by substantial evidence.'· 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, put to rest the 
debate as to whether cost-benefit analysis was required for 
70. 101 S. Ct. at 2481-83, "Cotton dust" is an airborne particulate by-product of the 
preparation and manufacture of cotton products, exposure to which produces a condition 
known as byssinosis. 1d. at 2482. Byssinosis was one of the diseases expressly mentioned 
by Congress when it passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act. LBGlSLATJVB HIS-
TORY, supra note IS, at 143. Byssinosis, also known as "brown lung," is a continuum 
disease marked by five progressive stages. 101 S. Ct. at 2484. Descriptions of the physical 
symptoms or byssinosis may be found in id. at n.9. 
71. 101 S. Ct. at 2486-87. The record compiled on cotton dust is amazing. It consists 
of exhibits, transcripts of oral and written testimony, post-hearing comments, and briefa 
totalling more than 105,000 pages. 1d. The atatement of findings and reasons supporting 
the cotton dust standard runs 69 pages and appears at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1980). 
72. 101 S. Ct. at 2487. 
73. 1d. at 2489. 
74. 1d. at 2497. Agency standards provided that both engineering controls and respi-
rators be used to meet the exposure standards for cotton dust. 29 C.F.R. § 
1910.1043(E)(I)-(3)(O (1980). In addition, the standards required that employers provide 
employees unable to wear respirators an opportunity to transfer to another position, if 
available, with no 1088 of earnings, employment rilhta or benefits. 1d. § 
1910.1043(F)(2)(v) (1980). The industry challenged this portion of the standard on the 
ground that the Agency lacked authority to promulgate such a standard. 101 S. Ct. at 
2504. The Court, deferring any ruling on the merits, remanded the question to the circuit 
court to determine whether this guarantee is related to the achievement of a safe and 
healthful work environment. 1d. at 2505-06. 
14
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OSHA regulations. 
Any standard based on a balancing of costs and 
benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different 
balance than that struck by Congress would be 
inconsistent with the command set forth in Sec-
tion [655(b)(5)]. Thus, cost-benefit analysis by 
OSHA is not required by the statute because fea-
sibility analysis is. '7& 
463 
The Court looked to the "plain meaning of the word feasible, '>78 
a comparison with other federal laws requiring cost-benefit anal-
ysis," and the legislative history of the Act," in reaching its 
decision. 
Analyzing the specific language of section 655(b)(5), the 
Court found that "Congress uses specific language when in-
tending that an agency engage in cost benefit analysis. . . . 
[C]ertainly in the light of its ordinary meaning, the word feasi-
ble cannot be construed to articulate such congressional 
intent. "78 
The Court then found that reading sections 655(b)(5) and 
652(8) together does not mandate a cost-benefit analysis, but 
merely requires that "standards [relating to toxic materials and 
harmful substances] be issued to prevent material impairment of 
health to the extent feasible. ''80 In section 655(b)(5) the Court 
noted a conspicuous absence of any indication that Congress im-
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2490. The Court stated that if cost·benefit analysis could be ap· 
plied to any decision made by the Agency it may be used in choosing alternative meth· 
ods of regulating exposure to toxic substances. [d. at n.29. 
76. [d. at 2490 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 831 (1976), THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 116 (1933) and FUNK & 
W AGNALL'S NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 903 (1957)). 
77. 101 S. Ct. at 2491. As examples of congressional language requiring either cost· 
benefit or feasibility analysis, the court cited pertinent sections from a variety of acts. 
See, e.g., the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1971,15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1976 & Supp. II 
1978); the Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976); Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312(b)(1)(2), 1314 (b)(l)(B) (Supp. II 
1978); the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6295 (c)(d) (1976 & 
Supp. II 1978) and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(B) 
(Supp. II 1978). 
78. 101 S. Ct. at 2493·97. 
79. [d. at 2491 (emphasis added). 
80. [d. at 2492 (emphasis in the original). The Court noted that ~he industry's argu· 
ment that § 652(b) imposes an overriding requirement of cost· benefit analysis to 
§ 655(b)(5) would be contrary to Congress' intent. [d. 
15
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posed a cost-benefit requirement on standards promulgated 
under section 655(b)(5).81 
The Court argued that while the legislative history showed 
that Congress did not intend to impose the chimerical goal of a 
risk-free workplace,1I it did intend that "the Act would create 
substantial costs for employers . . . when necessary to create a 
safe and healthful working environment. "88 
The industry claimed that the Secretary's economic feasibil-
ity estimates for the cost of complying with the cotton dust stan-
dard were not supported by substantial evidence as required in 
section 655(f) of the Act. Specifically, they charged that: "(1) 
. . . OSHA had underestimated the financial cost necessary to 
meet the standard's requirement and (2) that OSHA incorrectly 
found that the' Standard would not threaten the economic via-
bility of the cotton industry."" In reviewing the Agency find-
ings, the Court said it would reverse only if the circuit court 
"misapprehended or gravely misapplied" the standard.8& 
The Agency, in constructing a cost estimate for industry 
compliance with the standard, had the benefit of two analy-
ses-one commissioned by the Agency and the other by the in-
dustry. Both estimates were severely flawed and the Agency to-
tally rejected its own study." However, the Agency did adopt 
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2493. 
82. For this proposition the Court cited the statements of Senatora Javits in LEGIS' 
LATIVE HISTORY, .upro note 15, at 197 and Dominick, id. at 480·482, 502. 
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2496. The Court quoted Senator Yarborough's statement concern· 
ing the costs of compliance: 
One may well ask too expensive for whom? Is it too expensive 
for the company who for lack of proper safety equipment loses 
the services of its akilled employees? la it too expenlive for the 
employee who loses his hand or leg or eyesight? ... We are 
talking about people's liveB, not the indi1rerence of some cost 
accountants. 
Id. (quoting LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, .upro note 15, at 510). 
84. 101 S. Ct. at 2497. 
85. Id. (quoting Univeraal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951». 
86. 101 S. Ct. at 2497·99. The Agency commissioned Research Training Institute 
(RTI) and the Industry commissioned Hocutt·Thomas (H·T). RTI's estimated cost of 
compliance of $1.1 billion for engineering controls was rejected for three reasons: (1) the 
estimate was based on the false assumption that the controls would be applied to all 
equipment in the cotton mills (equipment processing synthetic fibera are exempted); (2) 
the study did not take into account the fact that lOme portions of industry were at or 
near compliance with the new standard; and, (3) the study did not use accurate data on 
16
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the industry-commissioned study, discounted by thirty percent, 
to determine the industry's compliance costs.'" The Court held 
that because of the unavailability of more reliable information 
and because the Act requires only that standards be promul-
gated on the basis of the best available evidence, "the Agency 
acted reasonably in adopting the [industry] estimate."" 
The Court found no problem in concluding that the indus-
try could bear the cost of complying with the standards promul-
gated by the Agency. The Agency concluded, based on its own 
discredited study, that, with minor dislocations on a firm-by-
firm basis, the industry could absorb the cost of the 
regulations." 
The Court also held that the substantial evidence test was 
not misapprehended or applied in the lower court." 
B. THE DISSENTS 
In dissent, Justice Stewart found that the Agency's finding 
of the feasibility evidence was merely "unsupported specula-
tion."'l Justice Stewart would require OSHA to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis to determine the economic feasibility of the 
Agency's proposed standards.'1 Unlike the majority, this dissent 
found the Agency's reliance on cost projections derived from the 
discredited studies to be insufficient to support a finding that 
the standard was economically feasible, based on substantial 
evidence." 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, repeated 
the industry. rd. at 2498. 
The H-T study W8B similarly flawed. It put industry compliance coats for engineer-
ing controls at $543 million. The Agency found this estimate overstated for four re8BOnB: 
(I) some mills had complied with the standards already; (2) the study failed to take into 
account an industry trend toward the replacement of older machinery; (3) the study 
failed to take into account new technologies; and (4) the study included controls covering 
synthetic machines not covered by the standard. rd. at 2498-99. 
87. ld. at 2499. 
88. ld. at 2500. 
89. rd. at 2501-04. 
90. rd. at 2504. 
91. rd. at 2507. 
92. ld. Justice Stewart's opinion makes no mention of how he would formulate the 
cost-benefit analysis. 
93.ld. 
17
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the essence of his concurring in the judgement opinion in Ameri-
can Petroleum,'· by invoking the non-delegation doctrine. Jus-
tice Rehnquist would find the Act unconstitutional because 
"Congress failed to choose aDlong those plausible interpreta-
tions."'11 This failure, he argues, amounts to an abdication of the 
Congress' responsibility to make legislative decisions." 
C. ANALYSIS 
The Court's decision in American Textile prohibiting the 
use of cost-benefit analysis by the Agency is a sound and reason-
able interpretation of the Act. Justice Brennan's use of the ordi-
nary and natural meaning of the word feasible together with a 
comparison with health environment-related statutes convinc-
ingly shows that Congress uses at least two separate methods of 
curtailing agency discretion in decision-making." 
These distinct patterns of legislation are evident, for exam-
ple, in the Surface Mining and Central Reclamation Act of 
1977'8 and Outer Continental Shelf Act Amendments of 1978." 
The Surface Mining Act requires that miners protect non-min-
eral resources and values "to the extent possible, using the best 
technology currently available. "100 The Outer Continental Shelf 
Amendments illustrate the cost-benefit approach. These Amend-
ments prohibit the Secretary of the Interior from regulating off-
shore drilling operations where "the incremental benefits [to 
health, safety, and the environment] are clearly insufficient to 
justify the incremental cost of using such technologies. "101 This 
clear duality in legislative intent is evident in several regulatory 
statutes. lOll The Court's conclusion that "where cost-benefit 
analysis is intended, Congress clearly indicated it on the face of 
the statute,"108 is decidedly supported by the duality in legisla-
tive intent and the purposeful inclusion of feasibility language 
by Congress. 
94. Id. at 2507. See 448 U.S. at 671. 
95. 101 S.Ct. at 2510 set forth in the margin at •. 
96. Id. at 2508-09. 
97. See notes 59 and 60 supra and accompanying text. 
98. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. II 1978). 
99. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (Supp. II 1978). 
100. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (Supp. II 1978). 
101. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (Supp. II 1978). 
102. See, e.g., Statutes cited in note 77, supra. 
103. 101 S. Ct. at 2491. See notes 77, 96-99, supra and 8$:companying text. 
18
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The legislative history of the Act, although replete with con-
cern that the Act not mandate a risk-free workplace, viewed 
worker health as paramount.IO<C Imposing a cost-benefit analysis 
on the Act would condition worker protection on the economic 
cost of such measures, and rearrange the priorities set by 
Congress.106 
Furthermore, the decision in American Textile precludes 
the application of President Reagan's Executive Order requiring 
that all major regulatory proposals of agencies be subjected to 
strict cost-benefit analysis"" The decision has wider implica-
tions: the Court has apparently ruled that all regulatory statutes 
which employ the economic feasibility standard may be barred 
from complying with the order"0'7 Viewed in separation of power 
terms, the decision prevents the executive from circumventing 
Congress through the use of executive orders.108 
Justice Stewart's dissent, unlike the majority, would rear-
range the priorities set by the Act based upon the dictates of 
cost-benefit analysis. The non-delegation doctrine reasoning ad-
vanced by Justice Rehnquist and joined by Chief Justice Burger 
is outmoded by political and legislative realities, except in ex-
104. "The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy ... to assure so far as 
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions and to preserve our human resources .... " 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). See also LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note IS, at 1150-51 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton); id. at 444, 510 
(remarks of Sen. Yarborough); id. at 1029·33. (remarks of Congressman Dent) id. at 502 
(remarks of Sen. Dominick); id. at 502·03 (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
105. See notes 7-14 supra and accompanying text. 
106. See Executive Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). This interpretation 
of the effect of American Textile is supported by an analysis of Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Youngstown set out three situations where the 
President's power is challenged and the legal consequences of each. In the third category, 
the President's power is at its lowest: "Where the President takes measures incompatible 
with the express or implied will of Congress." [d. at 637. In this situation, the President 
may "rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter." [d. American Textile falls into this third area of analysis. 
The Court in American Textile ruled that Congress mandated a feasibility rather than a 
cost-benefit analysis when OSHA issues standards governing exposure to toxins. Thus, 
the President's power to require a cost· benefit study is nil. 
I! the President's executive order were given legal effect after American Textile, the 
President would be granted legislative power unconstitutionally. This may be the reason 
that the Court rejected the Administration's motion, after President Reagan's inaugura-
tion, to vacate the court of appeals judgment and allow the Agency to reopen the record 
on cotton dust. See 101 S. Ct. at 2488 n.25. 
107. See Note, 95 HARV. L. REV. 319, 326 (1981). 
108. [d. 
19
Fisher: OSHA Standards
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
468 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:449 
treme situations. lOtI 
D. IMPLICATIONS 
It is clear that, absent a change in the composition of the 
Court or the language of the statute, the Supreme Court will not 
infuse a cost-benefit analysis into the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970.110 However, even after American Petroleum 
and American Textile, many unanswered qustions remain. The 
Agency answered the question of how standards will be formu-
lated when it determined to replace the old evaluation systeml11 
with a new four-step formula. The new system is based on: (1) a 
determination of significant risk of worker health impairments; 
(2) the potential for risk reduction; (3) an analysis of the eco-
nomic feasibility of the standard; and (4) a cost-effectiveness 
evaluation of the most efficient way to achieve protection.1lI 
The most important and scientifically difficult part of this 
analysis is the determination of what constitutes a significant 
risk of harm to workers, hence, worthy of regulation. This ques-
tion was left unanswered by American Petroleumlll and was not 
an issue in American Textile. lu 
At present, scientific knowledge about toxic and carcino-
genic substances is poor. III Scientific knowledge about the cause 
109. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
110. The retirement from the Court of Justice Stewart, and his subsequent replace-
ment by Justice O'Connor, will not affect the Court's position on the Act and cost-bene-
fit analysis because the change does not affect the majority in American Textile. 
111. Under the old evaluation system, OSHA used a three-step proce88 under which 
the Agency (1) determined if exposure to a substance posed a significant risk of material 
health impairment to the worker; (2) evaluated the potential for risk reduction by regu-
lation; and (3) analyzed the costs and benefits of alternative methods of regulations. 
[Current reports) 10 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1425 (1981). 
112. (Current reports) 11 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 131 (1981). 
113. While the plurality in American Petroleum discU88ed methods of establishing 
significant risk, the Court never explicitly stated how the Agency could meet ita burden. 
448 U.S. at 655-58; Note, The Supreme Court's New Occupational Health Standard for 
Benzene Exposure: Regulated Industry's Triumph oller Employee Health, 3 UTAH L. 
REV. 525, 548-49 (1981). 
114. 101 S. Ct. at 2488 n.25; 43 Fed. Reg. at 27,350 (1978). 
115. Berger & Ruskin, supra note 33, at 286-87; McGarrity, Substantille and Proce-
dural Discretion in Administratille Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating 
Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GBO. L.J. 729, 733-36 (1979). See generally, Amicus 
Curiae Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-
20
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and effects of industrial diseases and cancer is especially lacking 
in three broad areas: (1) how toxic substances cause disease on 
the cellular level;118 (2) the limitations of human and animal re-
search in identifying acceptable levels of human exposure;117 and 
(3) the statistical difficulties of translating animal reactions into 
chemicals. ll8 Faced with these scientific problems, some com-
mentators suggested that it would be impossible for OSHA to 
CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (available immediately on 
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). OSHA's Proposed Rule on the Identification, Classi-
fication, and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a Potential Carcinogenic Risk was 
the focus of the plurality in American Petroleum. 29 C.F.R. § 1990 (1980). The so-called 
cancer policy adopted by OSHA was subsequently amended to comport with the decision 
in American Petroleum. 46 Fed. Reg. 4,889 (1981). 
116. There are essentially two theories about how carcinogens cause cancer in indi-
vidual human cells: the "multiple" strike theory, and the "single" strike theory. Under 
the "multiple" strike theory, a cell requires several exposures to one or more carcino-
genic substances to become cancerous. Until the point at which cancer becomes carcino-
genic, it is theorized, the cell repairs itself or certain defenses are mobilized to neutralize 
the carcinogenic substances introduced into the cell. In the "single" strike theory, there 
is no repair or defense by the cell; exposure to the smallest amount of a carcinogen pro-
duces uncontrolled cancer. See Doniger, supra note 34, at 510, 511. 
117. Human experiments (epidemiological studies) are the most useful way of deter-
mining if a substance is toxic and what level of exposure humans can safely tolerate. 
There are three principal limitations on the usefulness of these studies: (1) the ethical 
problems which accompany attempts to expose humans to fatal substances; (2) the la-
tency period between exposure to a harmful substance and the development of a disease, 
usually 15-40 years; and (3) the limited reliability of any human experimentation be-
cause of exposure to other toxic substances in the environment, making it difficult to 
show a causal connection between a given exposure and the accompanying disease. rd. at 
511-12. Because certain animals (e.g., rats) have response characteristics similar to those 
of humans, and because of their shorter life spans, controlled environment, and the lack 
of ethical problems, animals are suitable for experimentation. rd. at 512. However, ani-
mals have a limited usefulness. Scientists can determine the cancer-causing potential of 
substances (carcinogenicity), but, these animal tests do not yield risk assessments. rd. at 
513. 
118. Unless huge experiments involving literally millions of animals (so-called 
"Mega-Mouse" experiments) are conducted, mathematical extrapolations must be used 
to translate test results into models showing the correlation between low levels of expo-
sure to a toxic substance and the expected incidence of cancer (dose-response curves). 
Problems occur with these extrapolations because the mathematical models differ widely 
in the construction of dose-response curves, sometimes by as much as a factor of 100,000. 
rd. at 513. 
It is also difficult to translate dose-response data across species lines from animals to 
humans. For example, the National Academy of Sciences conducted a study to predict 
the incidence of cancer from the effect of drinking one can of diet soda per day. "The 
results suggested that in each 50 million people there could be as few as 0.0007 cancers 
per year or as many as 3640. This is a range of error more than 5,OOO,OOO-fold." Amicus 
Curiae Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (available immediately on 
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). 
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meet Justice Steven's "significant risk" threshold. ll9 A close 
reading of Justice Steven's opinion in American Petroleum, 
however, suggests the opposite conclusion. In dictum, Justice 
Stevens stated not only that "the requirement that a significant 
risk is not a mathematical strait jacket"tlO but that "[the 
Agency] is not required to support its finding that a significant 
risk exists with anything approaching scientific certainty."llU In 
a footnote, the plurality noted that both human and animal 
studies provide an adequate basis upon which to base a decision 
to regulate toxic substances. till Justice Stevens concludes his 
analysis of how the Agency might prove "significant risk" by 
stating that "so long as they are supported by a body of reputa-
ble scientific though, the Agency is free to use conservative as-
sumptions in interpreting data with respect to carcinogens, risk-
ing error on. the side of over-protection rather than 
underprotection."1lI8 The American Petroleum plurality, in what 
may be its most telling statement, recognized that "[OSHA's] 
determination ... [of] a particular level of risk will be based on 
policy considerations."tI. The Court expressly left open the 
question as to what type of judicial review would be applied to 
those decisions.1lIII Clearly, the reason the Court struck down the 
119. See, Note, supra note 67, at 253·54; Note, Industry's Triumph, supra note 113, 
at 555; Note, supra note 68, at 345·46. Contra, Comment, The Significant Risk Require· 
ments in OSHA Regulation of Carcinogens: Industrial Union Department, AFL·CIO v. 
American Petroleum Institute, 33 STAN. L. Rsv. 551, 566 (1981). 
120. 448 U.S. at 655. 
121. Id. at 656. See also note 60 supra. 
122. 448 U.S. at 657 n.64. 
123. Id. at 656. 
124. Id. at 655·5.6 n.62. 
125. Although standards promulgated under the Act are to be reviewed under the 
substantial evidence test, 29 U.S.C. § 655(g) (1976), the Judiciary has developed methods 
to require the Agency to provide somewhat more than is required under the substantial 
evidence test to support its findings. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). In areas where scientific knowledge is sparse or in areas 
involving highly technical matters, the introduction of a subjectively higher standard of 
review may hinder or even preclude the regulatory goals of Congress. For example, the 
implied rejection in American Petroleum of the "single strike" theory of cancer causa· 
tion in humans may result in the deaths of workers from expoaure to toxic substances 
which would have been preventable using the "single strike" theory as a basis for regula· 
tion. For a discussion of the "single strike" theory see note 116, supra. See generally 
Leventhal, Enllironmental Decisionmaking and the Rule of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. 
REV. 509 (1974); Stewart, The Dellelopment of Administratille and Quasi·Constitutional 
Law in Judicial Relliew of Enllironmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air 
Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 714 (1977). 
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benzene standard was that a rigid carcinogen policy was em-
ployed by the Agency, not because projections could not be con-
structed showing a reduced level of risk at exposures below 10 
ppm. illS 
In American Textile the Court accepted the lower court's 
interpretation of the Act on the issue of economic feasibility.1I7 
That view permits OSHA to choose methods of achieving its ex-
posure levels that will, if necessary, impose such substantial 
costs on industry that some employers might be forced out of 
the market-place.128 Although the Court was silent on the issue, 
the point of economic infeasibility may be reached when the 
competitive balance of an entire industry is destabilized II. or 
where the industry becomes non-competitive with foreign com-
petitors in domestic markets. ISO The Agency's ability to impose 
substantial costs on an industry to achieve its exposure levels 
must be distinguished from OSHA's ability to mandate that the 
most costly methods be used to reach its goals. By implication, 
the Court, in American Textile, directed the Agency to choose 
the most cost-effective method of achieving its goals.1I1 Should 
OSHA, for example, choose the most expensive method of pro-
tecting workers from toxic substances when a less expensive 
method would assure the same level of protection, the decision 
probably would not meet the "reasonably necessary or appropri-
ate" test of section 652(8).181 So long as OSHA's cost-effective-
126. "In light of the fact that there are literally thousands of substances used in the 
workplace that have been identified as carcinogens or suspect carcinogens, the govern-
ment's theory would give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that might produce 
little, if any, discernible benefit." 448 U.S. at 645 (refuting the government's argument 
that §§ 652(8) and 655(b)(5) merely required "OSHA to issue standards that are reason-
ably calculated to produce a safer or more healthy work environment."). 
127. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-C/O v. Hodgson and Society ot Plastics Industry 
v. OSHA are discussed at notes 23·37 and accompanying text, supra. 
128. See note 30 and accompanying text, supra; Ct. 101 S. Ct. at 2495-97. 
129. See Note, 95 HARv. L. REv. 319, 325 (1981) (arguing that OSHA could deter-
mine if the competitive balance of an industry is disrupted by using an anti-trust analy-
sis). Cf, 101 S. Ct. at 2496 n.38. 
130. There is no reason to assume that a loss of competitive advantage to foreign 
competitors would preclude a finding of economic infeasibility. 
131. 101 S. Ct. at 2493 n.32. Cost-benefit analYSis must be distinguished from cost-
effectiveness. "Cost-benefit analysis ... is used by the decision-maker to establish socie-
tal goals as well as the means for achieving these goals, whereas cost-effectiveness analy-
sis only compares alternative means for achieving given goals." Baram, supra note 7, at 
474. 
132. A choice of controls to regulate explosure would not be "reasonably necessary" 
if another method would provide the same level of protection. 
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ness analysis is not used as a "Trojan horse" for cost-benefit 
analysis, however, and worker protection is not sacrificed, cost-
effectiveness analysis is a useful device. 
James D. Fisher 
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